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The primary goal of this paper is to investigate whether participation in terrorist activity 
can be linked to ignorance (measured through schooling) or to economic desperation 
(measured through poverty on the individual’s level and various economic indicators on 
the societal level) using newly culled data of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
terrorist cells. This paper performs a statistical analysis of the determinants of 
participation in Hamas and PIJ terrorist activities in Israel from the late 1980’s to the 
present, as well as a time series analysis of terrorist attacks in Israel with relation to 
economic conditions. The resulting evidence on the individual level suggests that both 
higher standards of living and higher levels of education are positively associated with 
participation in Hamas or PIJ. With regard to the societal economic condition, no 
sustainable link between terrorism and poverty and education could be found, which I 
interpret to mean that there is either no link or a very weak indirect link. Special attention 
is given to the suicide bomber phenomenon, and the analysis of the determinants of 
becoming a suicide bomber provides additional intriguing findings. In contrast with the 
“classic” characteristics of a suicidal individual (Hamermesh and Soss, 1974), suicide 
bombers tend to be of higher economic status and higher educational attainment than 
their counterparts in the population. Suicide bombers, however, come from lower socio-
economic groups when compared to other, non-suicidal, terrorists. 
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Many people in today’s global society, including many of its most prominent leaders 
and academics, maintain that terrorist activity is the direct result of ignorance and/or 
poverty.  This paper investigates whether terrorism really does have roots in destitution 
and lack of education. Specifically, I examine correlates of Palestinian terrorist attacks 
against Israeli targets using micro population data and aggregate time series data. The 
results of this analysis are surprising and might be perceived as counterintuitive. 
Common sense might suggest that individuals who have “nothing to lose” (or less to lose) 
would be more likely to engage in self-destructive activities.  Such conventional wisdom 
could be the result of an intuitive comparison of previous analyses of behaviors with 
terrorist activity. For instance, one might borrow from the traditional economic theory of 
crime (Becker, 1968) to analyze terrorist activity, or from the economic theory of suicide 
(Hamermesh and Soss, 1974) to analyze suicide bombers, or from the economics of 
religious sects (Berman, 2000)
1 to explain participation in secluded terrorist groups.   
Using these theories in an attempt to explain types of terrorism might misleadingly 
suggest that, similar to the way that people with fewer opportunities in the 
legal/outside/secular world would be more likely to commit crimes, commit suicide, or 
join the religious sects, people with fewer opportunities would likewise tend to join 
terrorist groups.  
Notwithstanding the apparent connection between terrorism and the other economic 
theories described above, the empirical evidence collected so far gives little reason to 
believe that materialistic or educational improvements would help reduce terrorism. If 
anything, the correlation I find is that those with higher education and higher living 
standards are more likely to participate in terrorist activity.  I believe these empirical 
findings emerge because terrorism is a distinct phenomenon and should be studied as 
such.  It is not yet completely clear how to explain terrorists’ motives without assuming 
irrational, ill or insane decision-making processes, but I am inclined to believe that strong 
                                                 
1 In a recent paper, Berman himself applies a model similar to the one used to explain ultra-orthodox Jews’ 
behavior to the Hamas and Taliban (Berman, 2002).  3
political motives combined with a subjective perception of injustice, rather than factual 
economic factors, are at play. 
To begin investigating the terrorist mindset, a good place to start is the widespread 
literature on “hate crimes”, a phenomenon that many (e.g., Hamm, 1998 and Kressell, 
1996) have considered closely related to terrorism.  Green Glaser, and Rich (1998) 
provide evidence showing that anti-black lynchings and real GNP growth were positively 
correlated from 1882 to 1938.  In addition, data from 1987 to 1995 in New York City 
shows that hate crimes against blacks, Jews, Asians and homosexuals were unrelated to 
the city’s unemployment rate.  Using data about hate crime groups in the United States, 
Jefferson and Pryor (1999) found that, in 1997, the probability of the existence of such 
groups, like the Ku Klux Klan, in a particular area was found to be positively associated 
with the share of the population in that area with at least a high school diploma.  The 
inverse relationship between hate crimes and poverty and/or lack of education is not 
confined to the U.S., as Krueger and Pischke (1997) found using data from Germany that 
education and the average manufacturing wage were unrelated to the amount of violence 
against foreigners.   
In addition to the work on hate crimes, a report produced by the Federal Research 
Division (1999) concerning the sociological characteristics of terrorists in the Cold War 
period concludes, “Terrorists in general have more than average education, and very few 
Western terrorists are uneducated or illiterate… Older members and leaders frequently 
were professionals such as doctors, bankers, lawyers, engineers, journalists, university 
professors, and mid-level government executives.”  Once again the trend is not confined 
by national boundaries, as seen in Russell and Miller (1983), who attempt to draw a 
sociological profile of the modern urban terrorist based on a compilation and analysis of 
more than 350 individual terrorists from Argentinean, Brazilian, German, Iranian, Irish, 
Italian, Japanese, Palestinian, Spanish, Turkish, and Uruguayan terrorist groups active 
during 1966-76. They found that “… approximately two-thirds of those identified 
terrorists are persons with some university training, university graduates or postgraduate 
students.” (p.55) 
An intriguing publication by Nasra Hassan (2001) already suggested that in the case 
of terrorism, the traditional models of crime, suicide, and religion might not apply. In an  4
article summarizing her interviews of nearly 250 terrorists and associates of terrorists 
(including failed suicide bombers, families of deceased bombers, and those who trained 
and prepared the bombers to their missions), she reported, “None of them were 
uneducated, desperately poor, simple minded or depressed. Many were middle class and, 
unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs. More than half of them were refugees from 
what is now Israel. Two were the sons of millionaires.”  
More recently, people have begun to doubt the intuition that poverty and ignorance 
are the root causes of terrorism.  In an article in the New York Times on the characteristics 
of the 9/11/2001 terrorist hijackers,
2 Jodi Wilgoren reports that “They were adults with 
education and skill ... spent years studying and training in the United States, collecting 
valuable commercial skills and facing many opportunities to change their minds. … they 
were not reckless young men facing dire economic conditions and dim prospects but men 
as old as 41 enjoying middle-class lives.”  Moreover, if terrorism is regarded as an 
extreme form of political activism, the inverse relationship with poverty and ignorance 
should not surprise us.  Lerner had already suggested this seemingly contradictory link in 
1958 following a study of political activism in the Middle East, where he concluded, 
“The data obviate the conventional assumption that the Extremists are simply the ‘have-
nots,’ suggesting rather that they are the ‘want-mores.’” (p.368) 
Despite the evidence to the contrary, the commonly held belief continues to be that 
poverty (of the individuals and society) and ignorance are major factors contributing to 
the existence of terrorism. Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, many 
prominent observers, including the following U.S. officials, have called for increased 
financial aid and educational assistance to end terrorism by eliminating what is believed 
to be its core causes. 
-  President George W. Bush, in a speech on the closing day of a five-day U.N. 
conference on poverty in Monterey, Mexico on March 22, 2002: “We fight 
against poverty because hope is an answer to terror…We will challenge the 
                                                 
2 Wilgoren, Jodi. “After the Attacks: The Hijackers; A Terrorist Profile Emerges That Confounds the 
Experts.” New York Times. Saturday, September 15, 2001, late ed.: A2. 
 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30710F7345C0C768DDDA00894D9404482  5
poverty and hopelessness and lack of education and failed governments that too 
often allow conditions that terrorists can seize and try to turn to their advantage.”
3 
-  First Lady Laura Bush in a speech to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development in Paris on May 15, 2002: “A lasting victory in the war against 
terror depends on educating the world's children because educated children are 
much more likely to embrace the values that defeat terror.”
4 
-  Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in an official US Department of State 
Document dated February 14, 2002 in Washington, DC: “I fully believe that the 
root cause of terrorism does come from situations where there is poverty, where 
there is ignorance, where people see no hope in their lives.”
5 
-  Former United States Vice President Al Gore told the Council on Foreign 
Relations in New York on February 12, 2002 that an ‘evil axis’ is formed 
primarily by poverty and ignorance, forcing many to engage in terrorist 
activities.
6 
-  Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Kenneth Dam on CBSNews in Islamabad, 
Pakistan on February 5, 2002: “Fighting the root causes of terrorism, poverty, and 
hopelessness is as important as fighting terrorism directly."
7 
 
Although some might think that these sentiments have become prevalent only after 
9/11, prominent diplomats asserted such opinions prior to 2001. For example: 
 
-  Former United States President William J. Clinton in a speech to the Jordanian 
Parliament in October of 1994, “On one side stand the forces of terror and 
extremism, who cloak themselves in the rhetoric of religion and nationalism. 
These forces of reaction feed on disillusionment, poverty and despair.”
8 




6 “For there is another Axis of Evil in the world: poverty and ignorance; disease and environmental 
disorder; corruption and political oppression. We may well put down terror in its present 
manifestations. But if we do not attend to the larger fundamentals as well, then the ground is fertile and 
has been seeded for the next generation of those born to hate us…”  
http://www.al-gore-2004.org/gorespeeches/02122002.htm 
7 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/02/05/attack/main328279.shtml 
8 http://meria.idc.ac.il/us-policy/data1994.html  6
-  Edward Djerejian, a top US diplomat and former U.S. ambassador to Syria (1988-
1991) and to Israel (1993-1994): "Experience suggests to us that political Islamic 
movements are to an important degree rooted in worsening socio-economic 
conditions in individual countries."
9 An excerpt of the Hearing of the 
Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 12, 
1993. 
 
Foreign officials from all over the world seem to hold the same views regarding this 
linkage: 
 
-  British Prime Minister Tony Blair in a speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet, 
Tuesday, November 13, 2001: “The dragon’s teeth [with regards to terrorism and 
terrorists] are planted in the fertile soil of . . . poverty and deprivation.”
10 
-  Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines, on MindaNews, June 12, 
2002: “I will be with you, people of Lamitan on the declaration of Independence 
Day to declare the freedom of the people of Basilan from the bondage of poverty 
and terrorism.”
11 
-  Prime Minister Ali Abul Ragheb of Jordan in the Jordan Times on Friday and 
Saturday, September 21-22, 2001: “Elaborating on the causes of terrorism, the 
prime minister cited political, economic and social conditions, including poverty, 
ignorance and frustration.”
12 
-  Greek Alternate Foreign Minister Tassos Giannitsis from the Embassy of Greece 
to the U.S., May 18, 2002: “Terrorism, drugs, poverty and underdevelopment are 
linked directly and should be jointly handled on a global level.”
13 
-  Shimon Peres, former Israeli Prime Minister, at a Briefing to UN Ambassadors 
and Senior UN Officials at the United Nations in New York on May 30, 1995: 
“We have to address ourselves to the young generation and to education, so that 
                                                 
9 Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations, Recommendations for U.S. 
Foreign Assistance to Africa: Hearing before Subcommittee on Africa before the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, 103
rd Congress, 1




13 http://www.greekembassy.org/press/newsflash/2002/May/nflash0518a.html  7
neither poverty nor ignorance will continue to feed fundamentalism, poverty, 
disillusion and hatred.”
14 
-  Terje Roed-Larsen, United Nations special coordinator, according to the 
August/September 2001 edition of the Washington Report on Middle East 
Affairs, summed up his speech at the “International Media Encounter on the 
Question of Palestine” on June 19




Many scientists and researchers of the highest ranks hold the same common belief: 
 
-  Elie Wiesel, 1986 Nobel Peace Prize recipient, at a gathering of Nobel Peace 
Prize laureates in Oslo, Norway in December 2001: “Education is the way to 
eliminate terrorism.”
16 
-  Kim Dae-jung, 2000 Nobel Peace Prize recipient and President of South Korea, at 
a gathering of Nobel Peace Prize laureates in Oslo, Norway in December 2001: 
“At the bottom of terrorism is poverty. That is the main cause.”
17 
-  Jessica Stern, lecturer on terrorism at Harvard University's Kennedy 
School of Government and the author of “The Ultimate Terrorists,” in a quote 
from “Being Feared Is Not Enough to Keep Us Safe,” which was published in the 
Washington Post on Saturday, September 15, 2001: “We have a stake in the 
welfare of other peoples and need to devote a much higher priority to health, 
education, and economic development, or new Osamas will continue to arise.”
18 
-  John O. McGinnis, from the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, 
in a National Security White Paper entitled “Expanding Trade: A Powerful 
Weapon Against Terrorism”: “Ignorance and poverty are the greatest friends of 
the terrorist, because the ignorant and impoverished are easy prey for the 
conspiracy theories and millennial religious visions that are the staple of the 
Islamic fanatics. In contrast, as people become better educated and more 





18 http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=ISP&ctype=article&item_id=270  8
prosperous, they will tend to oppose the arbitrary and theocratic rule promised by 
the terrorists as a threat to their prosperity and freedom.”
19 
-  James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, was reported to say, according 
to the BBC, “that rich countries must build on the global war against terrorism by 




The need for careful research examining the relationship between poverty, education, 
and terrorism is clear. The groundwork for such further research began with a recent 
work by Krueger and Maleckova (2002), who investigate the link between poverty and 
low education and participation in terrorist activity. Using biographical data of 129 
Hizbollah members killed in paramilitary actions in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, they 
found that both having a standard of living above the poverty line and having a 
secondary-school education or higher are positively associated with participation in 
Hizbollah. Their paper clearly puts into doubt the supposed benefit of investing in the 
eradication of poverty or in educational attainment as a means of directly fighting 
terrorism.  
It is important to test whether such results were specific to Hizbollah-Lebanon or 
whether they can be generalized to other terrorist groups, areas, and time periods. In 
particular, this paper attempts to verify if such results could be replicated using data 
relevant to terrorist activities of Hamas and PIJ in Israel and the Palestinian Authority. 
The data used was collected from biographies of Hamas and PIJ terrorists and population 
survey data to investigate the link between terrorism and individual income and 
education. A unique data set that accounts for each and every fatal terrorist incident 
against Israeli noncombatants together with Palestinian economic variables is used to 
investigate this link with respect to the society’s economic condition.   
The paper follows with a discussion of the definition of terrorism I have chosen to 
work with in the next section. The third section contains a short description of the 
different terrorist and militant groups involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with an 
                                                 
19 http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/trade.htm 
20 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1857642.stm  9
emphasis on the Hamas and PIJ because of their centrality to my research. The fourth 
section will provide some theoretical considerations concerning the relationship between 
education and income and terrorism. A description of the data I used in the different 
analyses makes up section five. The sixth section describes the statistical analysis used to 
measure the correlates of participation in Hamas and PIJ terrorist activities and the time 
series analysis used to estimate the relationship between economic variables and terrorist 
attacks. The results of the study are presented in section seven and section eight 
concludes the paper.  10
II. Definition of Terrorism 
 
 
Definitions of terrorism vary widely, and it is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to 
find a single definition that covers all aspects of terrorism as they exist in today’s world. 
A certain event can be defined as an act of terror in the views of one country and at the 
same time be defined as a “fight for freedom” by another. 
The FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”
21  Deluxe Black's Law Dictionary 
defines an act of terrorism as “An activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous 
to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws…and appears to be intended - (i) to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion, or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or 
kidnapping.”
22 
While the above definitions encompass a wide range of terrorism, I have chosen to 
use the definition used by the US State Department, which is contained in Title 22 of the 
United States Code, Section 2656f(d):  
•  The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant (1) targets by 
subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to 
influence an audience. 
•  The term ‘international terrorism’ means terrorism involving 
citizens or the territory of more than one country. 
•  The term ‘terrorist group’ means any group practicing, or that has 
significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism. 
(1) For purposes of this definition, the term "noncombatant" is 
interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel 
who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on 
duty…We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military 
installations or on armed military personnel when a state of 
military hostilities does not exist at the site.
23 
                                                 
21 Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Thirty Years of Terror: A Retrospective Edition.” Terrorism in the 
United States 1999. p. i.  http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror99.pdf 
22 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, p. 1473. 
23 The U.S. government has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes 
since 1983.   http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2419.htm  11
 
It is important to keep in mind that I have chosen to rely on the US State Department 
definition of terrorism in order to exploit the fact that the US State Department has 
already categorized and specified the set of contemporary terrorist groups (Hamas and 
PIJ are currently designated by the US Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations—FTOs).  However, using any other definition that regards terrorist action 
as the calculated use of unexpected, shocking, and unlawful violence against 
noncombatants (including, in addition to civilians, off-duty military and security 
personnel) and other symbolic targets perpetrated by a clandestine member(s) of a 
subnational group or a clandestine agent(s) for the psychological purpose of publicizing a 
political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government(s) or civilian 
population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause
24 would not change any of the 
analysis since it would unarguably label Hamas and PIJ militant activities as terrorist 
activities.  It is important to remember that in this paper, the nouns “terrorist” or 
“terrorists” do not necessarily refer to everyone within a terrorist organization, but to 
activists or operators who personally carry out a group’s terrorism strategy and their 
leaders. 
 
                                                 
24 This definition was borrowed from: Rex A. Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who 
Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September 1999.  12
III. Background 
The historical background and evolution of terrorist activities in the Middle East is 
complex, controversial, and, although important, is outside the scope of this paper and 
should be the subject of additional research. Instead of being an exhaustive study in the 
history of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, the goal of this section is to expose the 
different contemporary militant/terrorist forces in the Israeli-Palestinian region.
25 
Al-Fatah is a reverse acronym for “Harekat at-Tahrir al-Wataniyyeh al-
Falastiniyyeh” and translates to mean “an organization for liberation of Palestine,” and 
the word “Fatah” itself means “conquest with jihad.” Established by Yasser Arafat circa 
1960, Al-Fatah joined the PLO in 1968 and gained control in 1969. The group was based 
in Jordan until 1970 when it was expelled to Lebanon, and then moved again to Tunisia 
in 1982. The organization was active in numerous terrorist activities in the 1970’s and 
1980’s, but ceased these activities following the Oslo Agreement in 1993. Al-Fatah has 
three affiliates still carrying out terrorist activities: Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades, Tanzim, 
and Force 17. 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade was named after the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The 
group, consisting of terrorists from the West Bank, is affiliated with Al-Fatah and was 
established at the beginning of the 2
nd Intifada in September of 2000. The Martyrs 
Brigade is responsible for numerous terror activities including suicide bombing, sniper 
attacks, knife stabs and more. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade has so far taken responsibility for 
the deaths of more than 100 Israeli civilians and the injuries of thousands. 
Tanzim, which  means “Organization,” is an armed wing of Al-Fatah and was 
established in 1995. The group acts to balance the activity of the extreme groups, such as 
Hamas and PIJ, and has served as a driving force behind a number of riots, including the 
2
nd Intifada. Among its terrorist activities are the ambushing of vehicles, shootings, and 
bus bombings. The Tanzim consists of tens of thousands of members, spread throughout 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and is funded by the Palestinian Authority. The head of 
the Tanzim is Marwan Bargouti, who now stands trial in Israel for various acts of terror. 
                                                 
25 In addition to the background provided here, it might be useful to be acquainted with the Palestinian 
security forces and structure as described in Appendices C and D.   13
Tanzim is responsible for the deaths of approximately 30 Israeli civilians and the injuries 
of a few hundred. 
Force 17 is the personal security force for Yasser Arafat that was established in the 
early 1970’s and is funded by the PLO. It is a high quality, well-trained unit consisting of 
approximately 3,000 members, led by Faisal Abu Sharah, with a long history of terrorist 
activities against Israeli targets. The unit’s first commander, Ali Hassan Salameh, took 
part in the 1972 Olympics massacre of the Israeli delegation. Force 17 is responsible for 
the deaths of more than 10 Israeli civilians in terror activities. 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) - Formed by George Habash 
in 1967, the PFLP saw the elimination of Israel as facilitating the development of 
communism in the Middle East. The PFLP was an original member of the PLO, but 
opposed the PLO’s negotiations with Israel. The PFLP is responsible for the deaths of 
more than 100 Israeli civilians. 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP -GC) - 
The PFLP-GC split from the PFLP in 1968 under the leadership of their founder, Ahmad 
Za'rur.  Currently led by Ahmad Jibril, they continue to reject any kind of recognition of 
and negotiation with Israel and are responsible for the deaths of more than 50 Israeli 
civilians. 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) – The DFLP split from 
the PFLP in 1969 and supports the creation of a Palestinian state in any territory liberated 
from Israel. They are responsible for the deaths of more than 35 Israeli civilians. 
Hizbollah – This radical Shiite group that was formed and operated in Lebanon, 
which at times infiltrates the Israeli-Lebanese border, receives funding, weapons, 
explosives, and recruits from Iran. Their force includes a few hundred operatives and a 
few thousand supporters.  Hizbollah was responsible for more than 300 deaths and more 
than 500 injuries through its terror activities. 
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) - Sponsored by Iraq, Syria and Libya, the ANO 
advocates the destruction of Israel and uses is force of a few hundred operatives in an 
attempt to attain that goal. Although the ANO’s activities were critically reduced after the 
mysterious death of Abu Nidal in August 2002, they have been responsible for 
approximately 300 deaths and the wounding of hundreds more.  14
 
Hamas 
Hamas, a word meaning ‘courage’ and ‘bravery,’ is a short form in Arabic for 
“Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya” – meaning “the Islamic resistance movement.” 
Hamas is a radical Islamic organization based in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that first 
registered as a non-profit organization in 1978 led by Sheik Ahmad Yassin under the 
influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was established in the 1920s in Egypt with 
the purpose of an Islamic “revival”. When initiating its activity, Hamas’ activities mainly 
involved religious propaganda and social work through financing coming primarily from 
Islamic supporters around the world. 
When the 1
st Intifada broke in December of 1987, Hamas gained momentum along 
with the Intifada and expanded its activities by introducing a militant faction of the 
organization. Hamas declared Jihad (holy war) against Israel, with the stated purpose of 
destroying Israel and creating a Palestinian state between the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Jordan River. In pursuit of that goal, Hamas shifted the weight of its activities towards 
militancy, and today the overwhelming majority of Hamas’ activities are militant. 
In 1991, Hamas established the Iz al-Din Al Kassam brigades, which control the 
military and terrorist activities including intelligence, recruitment, and training. These 
brigades have a network of small cells that do not communicate with each other, so the 
fall of one cell will not cause the fall of others. The total estimated number of hard-core 
operatives is less than 400. 
Hamas leadership includes its founder and spiritual leader, Sheik Ahmad Yassin, and 
its two spokesmen, Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantisi and Abdul Haleq Natsheh. Militant leaders are 
less likely to be publicly known, but among the known ones are Hassan Yusuf and 
Mohammad Deif. Some of Hamas’ leaders who carried out numerous deadly terror 
activities against Israelis were targeted for extra-judicial execution by Israel, including 
Yahya Ayyash and Salah Shehada. The organization has strong financial support from 
three main sources: (1) unofficial bodies in Muslim countries, mostly in and around Saudi 
Arabia; (2) Iran; and (3) charity networks in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and abroad. 
Hamas stepped up its terrorist activities in stages. Initially, Hamas was only involved 
in disturbances and strikes, then it began the assassination of what it defined as  15
“collaborators with Israel.” It moved on to kidnapping and killing Israeli soldiers, then to 
knife attacks against soldiers and civilians, and finally to shootings, bombings, and 
suicide attacks in every place Israelis could be reached. Hamas took responsibility for the 
deaths of more than 500 Israeli civilians and soldiers in addition to thousands of injuries. 
Since Hamas’ activities are defined as Jihad, the group does not differentiate between 
soldiers and civilians, young and old—everything is justified by the cause. 
 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
Although there are many, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is the most well known 
extremist group using the name Islamic Jihad. The PIJ calls for an armed Islamic war 
against Israel in order to free Palestine and create an Islamic state instead of Israel.   
Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a translation from Arabic for “Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-
Filastini,” which means  “Movement for holy war to Palestine.” 
Students, inspired by the Iranian revolution and militant Islamic Egyptian 
organizations, founded the PIJ around 1980 in Egypt and were led by one of the founders, 
Fathi Shkaki. The PIJ was active mainly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and initially 
put emphasis on Islamic culture, postponing the Palestinian issue. In the 1980’s, the PIJ 
started its disruptive activities, and moved on to terrorist activities that included a number 
of attacks in the Gaza Strip in 1987 prior to the start of the Intifada in December.  As the 
PIJ increased its terrorist activities, two of its leaders – Shkaki and Abdul Aziz Odeh - 
were expelled to Lebanon in August of 1988, but Shkaki reorganized the group from 
there, where he also tightened the connections with Iran, PIJ’s main supporter. In addition 
to the financial funding from Iran, the PIJ also receives logistic assistance from Syria.  
The PIJ and Hamas were violent rivals until the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority in 1994, which began a period of relatively peaceful coexistence as they both 
terrorized Israel. Both organizations took responsibility for some of the worst terrorist 
acts and as a result, the PIJ gained skill, experience, and support from the Palestinian 
public. Shkaki was killed in 1995 in Malta, supposedly by Israeli agents, and he was 
succeeded by Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shalah, who resides in Damascus. Shkaki's death 
damaged the PIJ's position in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and Hamas no longer sees it  16
as a threatening rival. During its existence, the PIJ has claimed responsibility for over 140 
Israeli deaths and more than 1,000 injuries.  17
IV. Theoretical considerations: 
 
Traditional economic considerations following Becker (1968) suggest that people 
with higher education and higher income have more at stake (or more to lose) from 
taking part in criminal activities.  Such individuals, when choosing how to allocate their 
time between legal and illegal activities to maximize their utility, will presumably find 
better (and less risky) alternatives and would therefore have fewer reasons to join 
restrictive groups.  A simplified summary of the equilibrium described in Berman (2002) 
would suggest that high wage individuals are less likely to be impressed by “club 
goods”
26 and are therefore less likely to make sacrifices to join exclusive organizations.  
Furthermore, increased knowledge (a probable result of additional education) may 
provide better reasoning skills, which might deter potential terrorists from engaging in 
militant activities. 
Many other considerations have been given to support this conventional wisdom and I 
do not pretend that I have described most of the main arguments and theories supporting 
it. However, if terrorism is considered as a distinct phenomenon rather than considering it 
a branch of criminal activity, there is little in economic theory to conclusively prove a 
positive correlation exists between terrorist behavior and low education or income.  In 
fact, economic theory does not stipulate whether education and income are even linked to 
terrorist activities. 
Despite the lack of a proven association between education, economic status, and 
terrorism, there are many reasons that could cause highly educated and wealthy 
individuals to engage in terrorist activities. Educational content (particularly that which 
advocates particular political or religious messages) may exacerbate existing tensions and 
increased exposure to such content (in the form of additional education) may increase an 
individual’s propensity to participate in terrorist organizations.  That aside, improving 
reasoning skills may lead to involvement in terrorist organizations because individuals 
with more education may be better equipped to understand moral and religious 
justifications invoked by such groups.  Further, highly educated individuals may be more 
aware of situations of injustice and discrimination, and may be more aggravated by their 
                                                 
26 “Club goods” are special perks that only members of a particular group enjoy.  18
implications, again inducing them to participate in terrorist activities. Similarly, 
education may contribute to the development of a sense of social responsibility and 
highly educated individuals may feel the need to contribute to particular causes.  If an 
individual is a proponent of a belief that is primarily advocated via terrorism, he may be 
more likely to become an active participant in terrorist activities.   
In addition to the preceding argument, highly educated individuals may care more 
about preserving image and could be more easily swayed by public opinion in their 
behavior, which may lead such individuals to engage in terrorist activities if terrorism 
enjoys popular support. Moreover, individuals initially interested in joining terrorist 
organizations might be more likely to get more education in an attempt to become an 
active terrorist. If education improves performance in terrorist organizations, an 
individual with militant tendencies might acquire more education in order to be more 
successful in such activities.  Because terrorism might require additional education, one 
cannot a priori dismiss the possibility that terrorism is in fact a high-skill occupation. 
Terrorism may also be a means of achieving success for individuals with limited 
opportunities elsewhere.  Therefore, terrorist organizations might attract highly 
successful (and, most likely, highly educated) individuals that are otherwise well 
qualified but cannot succeed in the non-terrorism marketplace because of their heritage, 
social standing, etc. (this would especially be true in non-democratic societies). It is also 
possible that terrorist organizations are faced with an excessive supply of potential 
participants and can therefore choose the select few they desire. Consequently, it may be 
that the potential terrorists selected by these groups are highly-educated even though, on 
average, the education of those willing to join such organizations may be no greater than 
average.   
Likewise, wealth may also increase the likelihood that an individual will participate 
in terrorist activities.  For example, terrorism may require a certain degree of wealth 
because capital provides the means to carrying out acts of terror. Weapons must be 
acquired on the black market, which is extremely expensive (and could preclude poor 
individuals from participating) due to the limited access to warfare equipment in areas 
where terrorism is prevalent as a result of the presence of official police and army forces.  
In addition, wealthy individuals may be more likely to encounter barriers and restrictions  19
in daily life (that poorer individuals might not come across) because of the opportunities 
that wealth provides (e.g., in governmental paperwork, access to financial markets, and 
commercial spheres).  By being exposed to such restrictions, wealthy individuals may be 
more likely to become enraged by certain organizations or groups, and, therefore, may be 
more likely to engage in terrorist activities. Moreover, it is plausible that relatively poorer 
individuals are more preoccupied with daily matters, such as providing for their families, 
and end up devoting less attention to militant struggles.  
To conclude, it cannot be dismissed that wealthy and educated individuals would 
necessarily be averse to participation in terrorist activity.  In fact, there is nothing in 
economic theory that is a priori inconsistent with evidence showing that high-education, 
high-income individuals are more likely to participate in terrorist activities.  20
V. Data and Sample: 
 
Terrorists’ Biographical Data and its Counterfactual Population Survey Data 
In my research, I have been able to translate and collect information from the 
biographies of 335 Palestinian Terrorists. To find the data, I tracked down “Shahid” 
(deceased “martyrs”) publications from websites and Online Journals of the Hamas, 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)
27. In 
addition, I have used a PIJ publication containing the biographies of 50 PIJ leaders that 
were part of a group of 417 leaders and foot soldiers of terror groups that were expelled 
to Lebanon by Israel on December 17, 1992. Altogether, the data consists of observations 
taken from the available biographies with the following breakdown: 
 
183 “Shahids” of the Hamas; 
103 “Shahids” of the PIJ, one of who was also a Hamas member; 
50 leaders of the PIJ; 
 
In 319 of the 335 cases, the date of the biography could be determined either because 
it corresponded to the date of death of the “Shahid”, or because the terrorist was expelled 
to Lebanon on a known date. The date of the biography puts a “timestamp” on the data, 
which ranges from 1987 to 2002
28. In the 319 cases where the date is known, 35 percent 
(111) occurred between 1992-1995 and 57 percent (183) occurred between 2000-2002. 
                                                 
27   Hamas’s website http://www.palestine-info.net/arabic/hamas/shuhda/shuhda.htm later replaced with 
http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/hamas/shuhda/shuhda.htm 
  The Hamas’s military wing (Iz Al Din Al Qassam) online journal describes its “Martyrs” on 
http://www.qassam.org/shohadaa/shohadaa_1990/photo_1990/1990.htm   
  to  http://www.qassam.org/shohadaa/shohadaa_2002/photo_2002/2002.htm for the respective years and 
on Hamas’s Al Qassam shuhada memorial association http://www.sabiroon.org/. 
  Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s online journal http://www.qudsway.com/, their website (“Jihad Islami”) 
http://www.jihadonline.org/ and http://www.shuhadaa.com/ 
  Finally, additional limited data can be found on the Palestinian authority official websites 
http://www.pnic.gov.ps/arabic/quds/quds_e_martyrs.html and 
http://www.pnic.gov.ps/arabic/quds/martyrs/martyrs.html  
  (Note that most Martyrs in the PA websites are not considered terrorists by my definition so that those 
sites were used only to complement data on already-identified terrorists). 
28 The first biography is dated October 6, 1987 and the latest biography I have included in the data set is 
dated May 6, 2002 (I have continued to collect the biographies published since, but more recent 
biographies await translation).  21
Of the 171 observations from which it can be determined whether or not the death 
was the result of a planned attack, approximately 89 percent (152) were planned attacks 
and approximately 11 percent (19) were not planned attacks. Out of the planned attacks, 
66 (39 percent) were suicide attacks – 43 by Hamas members, 22 by PIJ members, and 
one by a member of both organizations. Cases where the attack was not planned include 
attacks initiated by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and attacks carried out during or 
after resisting arrest. In the cases where it was clear that the “Shahid’s” death was the 
result of an IDF extra-judicial execution (targeted assassination), it was necessary to 
check available resources to determine whether the “Shahid” had committed previous 
terror attacks or been arrested, in order to establish his presence, or lack thereof, on the 
list of terrorists.  In addition, 95 of the observations included information about the 
existence or non-existence of a will; approximately 93 percent (88) included a will 
showing that the “Shahid” knew his death was near. 
Out of the 335 biographies, 114 gave specific details on whether or not the individual 
participated in one or more previous attacks. Of those 114, 96 percent (109) participated 
in previous terror attacks, leaving only five biographies indicating clearly that the 
“Shahid” had no prior terrorist activity. Also, out of the 173 cases in which it was known 
whether or not the individual had been arrested for participating in terrorist activity, 91 
percent (158) had been arrested previously for participating in terrorist activity. 
From 284 observations that give a clear indication of rank in the organization, 68 
percent (193) were foot soldiers and 32 percent (91) were leaders. The leader category 
includes cell commanders in charge of cells of 3-6 foot soldiers. All available biographies 
are of males, of which 32 percent (106) were married, 39 percent (132) were single, and 
there was no information for the remaining 29 percent (97). The biographies describe 
men covering a very wide spectrum of professions, from doctors to teachers to unskilled 
workers, as well as full-time employees of terror organizations, i.e., Hamas and PIJ.  
54 percent (168) of the terrorists lived in urban localities and 23 percent (73) lived in 
refugee camps. For the 306 cases in which the place of birth is known, 96 percent (293) 
were born in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Out of the 284 for which both place and year 
of birth are known, 25 percent (71) were born while the territories were under Jordanian  22
rule (West Bank) or Egyptian Rule (Gaza Strip), and 75 percent (213) were born after the 
territories were under Israeli rule. 
In 215 biographies the terrorist’s religion was either clearly indicated or could be 
deduced indirectly from the information, and in all cases, the individual was Muslim. The 
religion was not indicated in the rest of the biographies, but it is reasonable to assume 
that the others were Muslims as well, given the nature of the organizations to which they 
belonged (since both Hamas and PIJ are religious Muslim organizations and their militant 
activity is defined as Jihad—a Muslim, religious war). In addition, there were 165 
biographies with descriptions of some kind of religious studies. 
Inferring poverty status presented more of a challenge. Although some biographies 
clearly implied an individual’s poverty status in statements such as “he lived in poverty” 
or “he was a wealthy man,” this was not the case for all observations.  When possible, 
poverty status was inferred from available information on the individual’s occupation, 
foreign travel history (e.g., traveled abroad), car ownership, computer availability, etc. 
For example, in one biography it was mentioned that the individual dropped out of 
college due to financial burdens, on another biography it was mentioned that the 
individual owned a new car which he used for weapon’s smuggling. In such cases, I 
classified the former as poor while not the later. In other cases I relied on family 
background descriptions, such as parents’ occupations, to infer poverty status. For 
example, one biography described the financial dependency of the individual’s family on 
charity networks since his father was sick and couldn’t afford paying the medical bills, on 
another biography it was mentioned that the individual’s family owned a successful 
luggage factory and that the father is one of the wealthiest businessmen in the area. Once 
again, I classified the former as poor while not the later. Poverty status information could 
be inferred for approximately 69 percent (230) of all cases. 
One of the advantages in using the method of data collection from reports about 
“Shahids” [deceased martyrs] derives from the fact that reporting about the “Shahid” is a 
highly divine obligation, and according to Islam it is considered a sin if one does not hail  23
a “Shahid”.
29 As a result, it is probably safe to assume that most of the militants from the 
terrorist organizations that died were reported in one way or another. Therefore, by 
collecting the data from the organizations’ own publications and newspapers, some 
information should exist for each and every “Shahid” that belonged to the 
organizations.
30 
Obtaining data on the general population in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and 
Gaza Strip for the relevant period proved to be difficult as well. The latest reliable and 
organized data available was for 1993 from the “Labor Force Surveys in Judea, Samaria 
and Gaza” (ISDC 1995), which includes all residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza living 
in households, not including Israeli residents living in these areas
31. The sampling 
methods and definitions used in this Survey are similar to those used in the Israeli Labor 
Force Surveys. 
This survey of households in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has been continually 
conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics from August 1968 to September 1995, 
when each household was investigated four times over six quarters. The survey consisted 
of two investigations during two consecutive quarters and, after a break of two quarters, 
two additional investigations. The household questionnaire contains details of household 
composition and dwelling. The personal questionnaire (answered by persons aged 15 and 
over) includes basic demographic as well as labor force characteristics and job location 
(in Israel or in the territories and wages of workers). 
Due to the events of the 1
st Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza Strip area from the 
end of 1987 through 1991, enumeration suffered from difficulties of coverage as well as 
from fewer quality responses. Also, since the April-June 1994 Survey, the data does not 
contain population figures from the autonomous areas of Gaza and Jericho (i.e. a 
significant part of the area relevant for a control group has been under PNA control since 
1994). Due to the current situation in the PNA areas and administration, I could not attain 
more recently updated data.  These facts combined with the facts that more than a third of 
                                                 
29 Ergun M. Caner, professor of theology and church history at Criswell College in Dallas and co-author of  
“Unveiling Islam” with his brother Emir, used a similar argument when asked if he was sure that 
Osama Bin Laden was still alive after the US bombings in Afghanistan. 
30 Although biographies probably exist for every “Shahid”, some did not contain any relevant data that 
could be used for statistical analysis. 
31 This data was used by Joshua Angrist (1995). “The economic returns to schooling in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip”, American Economic Review, Vol. 85, 4, Dec. 1995.   24
the Hamas and PIJ biographies with known publication dates are from the 1992-95 period 
and 96 percent (293) of the 306 individuals for whom place of residence was known 
resided in the West Bank or Gaza Strip made me consider the 1993 survey population of 
similar age, sex and religion to be the most appropriate control group available. Another 
advantage to using the “Labor Force Surveys in Judea, Samaria and Gaza” is the size of 
the 1993 survey sample (99,193 observations) and its quality.  
Because the sample of terrorists contained only Muslim males between 15 and 56 
years old, I have restricted the survey sample to the 41,762 Muslim males between the 
ages of 15 and 56 as well.  
In the last decade, the income and education levels of the inhabitants of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip deteriorated due to political and security reasons caused by the 
ongoing conflict in the region. Therefore, the use of control group data from 1993 instead 
of more recent data may, if anything, under-represent the poor and less educated in the 
population.  
With respect to educational attainment it was not a priori evident that it did not rise in 
the last few years, something that, if true, would make the use of control group data from 
1993 inappropriate. A comparison was then performed between the educational 
distribution of the Palestinian population in the relevant ages obtained from the 1993 
survey sample and the distribution obtained from a survey collected by the Palestinian 
Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) from December 19 to 24, 2001.
32 From 
the comparison displayed in appendix B, it is clear that, if anything, educational 
attainment was lower in 2001 compared to 1993.  Therefore, once again, the use of 
control group data from 1993 instead of more recent data may, if anything, under-
represent the less educated in the population.  
The following potential problems with the terrorist biographical data and the survey 
data are worth emphasizing: 
- There is no indication in the “Labor Force Surveys in Judea, Samaria and Gaza” 
whether or not an individual is also engaged in Hamas or PIJ terrorist activities. 
                                                 
32 The questionnaire and aggregate results are available from: 
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2001/p3a.html 
  The breakdown of this data by educational level was provided by Alan B. Krueger, Bendheim Professor 
of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University.  25
However, I estimate the Hamas and PIJ active militants to represent less than 1 in 
1,000 people and suicide bombers to represent less than 1 in 100,000 people in the 
relevant gender, age, and religion group of the population. I ignore the fact that, in 
principle, some individuals of the survey sample may have belonged to those terrorist 
groups as well. 
- Most of the deceased terrorists died during a planned terrorist attack on their part; 
however, some died due to Israeli targeted assassinations. Since targeted terrorists are 
presumably of higher rank, and thus higher income and/or education, the results 
might suffer from a bias that would be introduced by the overestimation of relatively 
better off terrorists. In order to evaluate this potential bias, all tests were repeated 
using only the 157 observations for which I knew from the biography that the attack 
was premeditated. The results remained identical in signs and statistically significant. 
- Because of the division of labor within any organization, different activities are 
assigned according to one’s rank. Assuming that lower ranking terrorists are assigned 
riskier tasks, it is probable that the share of low ranked soldiers within the set of 
deceased is larger than their share in the organization. If so, my sample would under-
represent the number of highly educated terrorists from middle or upper income 
families. 
- Another consideration might be given to a potential reporting bias. One might suspect 
that since these biographies are intended to hail the deceased they would refrain from 
publishing facts that might be considered unflattering or humiliating. In fact, the 
suspicions increase when one reads the many lengthy descriptions of the deceased’s 
devotion to the religion and to the cause, which never mention the possible doubts in 
the goals or the means that they employed. Also, the clearly exaggerated 
glorifications indicating the bravery of the deceased adds to the suspicion of reporting 
objectivity bias. It is not clear, however, if descriptions of one’s wealth would be 
exaggerated in a society where being poor is associated with humbleness. In fact, in 
biographies in which poverty is mentioned, it is clearly emphasized with pride. Some 
biographies, however, indicated wealth with pride, suggesting that it was associated 
with a position of respect for the deceased and his family. If anything, it seems that 
extremities on both sides might be over represented, since average wealth or income  26
might not add to the glorification and commemoration process. To overcome this 
problem, one would ideally want to have another, orthogonal source of reporting for 
comparison. To the best of my knowledge, no additional sources exist. In the only 
case where an individual’s biography was reported by both the Hamas and the PIJ, 
the articles tended to be in agreement. 
- An additional problem arises from the fact that variables of interest (i.e. schooling 
and poverty) for some individuals were inferred on the basis of existing information. 
For example, I used the type of last school attended or the highest degree achieved in 
order to infer the number of years of schooling. Thus, the data may not be perfectly 
comparable. 
- Potentially the most significant problem is the fact that in most cases poverty status of 
terrorists was inferred from variables indicating one’s wealth. However, the 
population survey data did not give any information on the individual’s (or the 
family’s) accumulated wealth. Ideally, I would use an identical variable, from both 
the population survey data and for the ‘Shahids’ biographical data, indicating if a 
minimum substance level is met or not. In the absence of such a variable, monthly 
wage was used to determine poverty status in the population survey. On the one hand, 
the measures are hardly comparable, but on the other hand, we also know from 
theoretical works (Danforth, 1979) as well as empirical evidence (Bloemen and 
Stancanelli, 2001) that higher levels of wealth result in higher reservation wages, thus 
higher wages for the ones employed. Moreover, the criteria for being considered poor 
among the population survey has been increased in an attempt to ‘bend the curve 
backward,’ whereas I have classified a ‘Shahid’ above poverty only when the 
biography indicated possessions or a standard of living that would not be possible 
when destitute. So, only individuals with extremely low wages
33 were considered 
poor in the survey population.  The cutoff point was set at the point that someone 
earning such a wage could not possibly afford to maintain the assets possessed by the 
above-poverty terrorists. For example, owning a car would not be possible due to 
maintenance costs alone, travels abroad would be out of reach, etc. Additional 
                                                 
33 In order to be categorized as poor, one had to earn less than 40% of the Israeli minimum wage, which is 
approximately equal to 18% of the Israeli average wage.  27
exogenous information, such as the very limited fraction of the population that has 
access to a car (approx. 20 percent) or a computer (approximately 4 percent)
34, would 
suggest that, when comparing to the terrorists’ data, the share of the above-poverty in 
the general population has been overestimated. In fact, the level of poverty I obtained 




Time Series Terrorist Attacks and Economic Indicators Data 
For time series analysis purposes, an additional data set was constructed containing 
daily information on each and every fatal
36 terrorist attack against noncombatants
37 that 
occurred on Israeli soil
38 from 1949 to January 31, 2003.  Every attack is described by 
date, method of operation, location, terrorist organizations claiming responsibility, and 
additional data about the victims, such as age, gender, and place of residence. The 
procedure in which the data was collected was as follows: 
First, data was gathered from the Israeli Foreign Ministry, which publicly provides a 
list containing major terrorist attacks for which the description is fairly detailed, although 
it lacks information in some cases
39. Since the information provided by the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry only covers certain time periods, it was necessary to search for data 
from other sources.  I chose the information provided by the National Insurance Institute 
of Israel
40 (NIII) for the time periods that data from the Israeli Foreign Ministry was 
unavailable.  The main reason I chose the NIII to create a continuous data set is because it 
is regulated by the government, and is therefore very reliable. In fact, the NIII is 
                                                 
34 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – Table 25 : Percentage of Palestinian Households By 
Availability of Some Durable Goods (1997). 
35 A report from January 2003 produced by William Bell, a Christian Aid policy officer for Palestine and 
Israel find that “Almost three-quarters of Palestinians now live on less than US$2 a day – below the 
official UN poverty line.”  http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/0301isra/losing.htm 
36 Due to the collection procedure constraints, only attacks in which someone besides the terrorist died were 
included. 
37 The term noncombatant is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the 
time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. 
38 This includes occupied territories when under Israeli control. 
39 http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/home.asp 
40  The National Insurance Institute of Israel is Israel’s counterpart to the U.S. Social Security 
Administration. http://www.btl.gov.il/  28
obligated by law
41 to track every registered death and compensate relatives in cases of 
deaths caused by terrorist attacks
42.  Despite the lack of inaccuracies and perfect 
continuity of a data set comprised solely of data from the NIII, compiling such a data set 
would require extensive further research (the research techniques are described below for 
the cases included in this data set).
43 
The information provided by the NIII concerns deceased individuals on a case-by-
case basis
44. Each death appeared on a different file and, when all necessary information 
was not included for a particular case, required additional newspaper archival research in 
order to distinguish the case as a victim of a terrorist attack (versus other acts of hostility) 
and to be included in the data set. Additional research in Israeli newspapers such as 
Ha’aretz and Ma’ariv, which obviously had to be translated, was also necessary to gather 
relevant data on the attacks, such as location, type of attack, organizations claiming 
responsibility, etc. (this information was not provided by the NIII, since they deal with 
the individual victims and not the perpetrators).  Another source of data came from the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The IDF keeps most of its data confidential, so access to 
the more detailed, classified data proved impossible. Therefore, only the publicly 
provided summarized data was used for cross-reference purposes. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the most accurate, comprehensive, unclassified dataset available 
regarding fatal terrorist attacks against noncombatants on Israeli soil
45. The data includes 
information on 1,857 fatalities from 883 attacks
46. 
Data from the ICBS (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics), the PCBS (Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics), and the CIA World Factbook was used to obtain the size of 
the Israeli and Palestinian populations, the total area controlled by Israel at the time of the 
                                                 
41 The author’s free translation is: The law of benefits to victims from hostilities, 1970.  
שת הביא יעגפנל םילומגתה קוח "  ל 1970  
42 The law specifies that any Israeli citizen or resident, or a person who entered Israel legally, who was 
injured by an act of hostility, is eligible for benefits. Monthly Dependent’s Benefits are paid to the 
widows or parents of a person who passed away due to a hostile action. Hostile action injury/death - an 
injury/death due to an act of hostility by enemy forces or under circumstances in which there was 
reasonable fear of hostile actions, as well as injury/death caused by a weapon that was intended for 
hostile actions - all conditional upon approval by the authority appointed by the Ministry of Defense 
that this is a hostile action. 
43 I have compared the data collected from the Israeli Foreign Ministry with several randomly chosen cases 
collected from the NIII and found no case of discrepancy. 
44 http://www.laad.btl.gov.il/ 
45 A summary of attacks and deaths appears in Appendix A. 
46 This includes 515 deaths from 75 suicide attacks.  29
attacks, and additional economic variables regarding the Palestinian population at time of 
attacks, such as GDP and average wage. 
As with the biographical data, potential problems arise with the time series terrorist 
attacks data and the economic variables data that are worth emphasizing.  
- The time series terrorist attack data includes only attacks in which someone besides 
the terrorist died, so that foiled attacks as well as “unsuccessful” attacks in terms of 
producing casualties, as well as terrorist attacks outside Israel
47 are not counted. Since 
we are interested in the variables inducing participation in terrorist activities and not 
necessarily “successful” or local terrorist activities, we might be omitting relevant 
terrorist events. In addition, fatal attacks for which the perpetrator remained unknown 
are counted. Such attacks should not be included if not committed by Palestinians or 
if committed by Palestinians who do not live in the Palestinian territories, and thus 
are not directly affected by the economics of the region. 
- The economic indicator variables data was collected from different sources since no 
one source could provide continuous data for the region. The differences between the 
sources in their methodology, definitions and the actual geographic area they covered 
might be significant and could potentially reduce the validity of any year-to-year 
comparison. I have tried to control for this problem by introducing dummy variables 
for the different sources. 
Despite the limitations of the different data sets, the sample of terrorists does provide 
information on the characteristics of individuals engaged in Hamas and PIJ terrorist 
activities (and suicide bombers in particular), while the time series analysis can help 
answer the broader questions about the links between economic conditions and terrorism. 
 
                                                 
47 Including occupied territories.  30
VI. Estimation Strategies: 
As previously discussed, one goal of this paper is to incorporate covariates and 
estimate the correlates of participation in Palestinian terrorist (Hamas and Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad) activities in general as well as the correlates of becoming a Hamas or PIJ 
suicide bomber, in particular. The data used was extracted from terrorists’ biographies as 
well as the “Labor Force Surveys in Judea, Samaria and Gaza” from which I have drawn 
a relevant comparison group
48.  
Preliminary tabulations of demographic characteristics broken down by the groups of 
interest (i.e., terrorists or suicide bombers versus the general population) suggest that 
there are differences between the general population and the terrorist sample. A Chi-
square test performed on each of the relevant characteristics refers to a test of the null 
hypothesis that the characteristic is independent of terrorist status.   
In order to see if the tabulation results hold statistically when introducing control 
characteristics I used a logistic probability model. Specifically, I model the effect of 
suspected variables of influence (i.e. schooling and poverty status) on the outcome (yi) as: 
yi = xiβ 1 + schoolingiβ 2 + povertyiβ 3 + ei
  where yi is a discrete variable that equals 1 if 
the outcome is positive (e.g., if the individual participated in Hamas or PIJ terrorist 
activities), and equals 0 otherwise. yi might be a function of several other observed 
characteristics,  xi, which include age, marital status, place of residence, employment 
status, etc., so those variables were included when found fit. The coefficients β 2 and β 3 
would then be the logistic estimates of schooling and poverty status, respectively, on the 
dependent variable. From these coefficients, the slope (marginal effect) can be easily 
calculated. However, this setup presents a classic problem of choice-based sampling 
because the terrorists were selected for inclusion in the sample on the basis that the 
dependent variable of the logistic equation equals one. Consequently, the sample does not 
constitute a random sample and the estimates will generally be inconsistent (Manski and 
Lerner, 1977). Weighting the data by the ratio of the estimated relative frequencies of the 
                                                 
48 See section V for details about the data and the collection procedure.  31
subjected groups in the population to their relative frequencies in the sample should yield 
consistent estimates
49. 
For the purpose of analyzing the effect of economic condition on the number of 
terrorist attacks, a panel of economic indicators and time series data on terrorist attacks 
for the matching periods
50 is implemented. Because the number of attacks is a count 
variable, a linear regression model is inappropriate. Since I could not assume a priori 
equality of the conditional mean and variance functions, I estimated a negative binomial 
regression model.   
Specifically, I modeled the bivariate relationships as:  log(yt) = β xt + et, where yt is 
the number of terrorist attacks in year t, and xt is the economic indicator (e.g., GDP 
growth, the log of the average wage, etc.) for year t. In cases where the economic 
indicator variables were taken from two different sources (e.g., the ICBS and the PCBS), 
a dummy variable was used to control for the possibility of incongruous values that could 
result from differences in collection methods between the sources. The relationship then 
becomes log(yt) = β 1xt + β 2dt + et, where dt is the dummy variable for year t. Similarly, 
if the data was taken from three different sources, I included two dummies, one for every 
additional source. I also tested for the inclusion of a time trend, and repeated all 
estimations when controlling for population changes (i.e., including the log of population 
size on the right-hand side). 
In the case of suicide attacks, any time series analysis would have been much less 
reliable due to the relatively short period at hand
51, but I was able to double the number 
of observations by splitting the data into two main regions (i.e., Gaza and the West 
Bank). This was feasible because for most suicide attacks
52, I was able to identify the 
                                                 
49 Krueger and Maleckova (2002) encountered the exact same problem; I am following their suggested 
methodological technique to create consistent estimates.  
50 See section V for details about the data and the collection procedure. The length of the period analyzed in 
each case was set by the period for which the economic variables were to be found. 
51 The first suicide bombing attack in Israel is usually attributed to Sahar Tamam Nabulsi, who on April 16, 
1993 used his truck as a guided bomb. This event, however, is not accounted for in my time series data 
since no Israeli citizen died in the incident. Depending on the exact definition of fatal suicide attack, the 
number of observations (years) could range from 9 (1994-2002) to 14 (1989-2002). This does not 
account for one event on December 11, 1974, which cannot conclusively be identified as a suicide 
attack.  
52As of January 2003, for the 75 fatal suicide attacks since 1989 (68 since April 1994), the attack originated 
from the West Bank in 47 cases (45 cases since 1994) and from Gaza in 15 cases (10 since 1994). In 2  32
place from which the terrorist originated (i.e., his place of residence). The identification 
was done by matching the dates of attacks from the time series data set with the dates of 
deaths from the biographies data set.
53 I then used the variability in the economic 
performance and the number of suicide attacks originating from the two regions to model 
the relationship as follows: log(yr,t) = β xr,t + er,t, where yr,t is the number of suicide 
attacks in which the terrorist’s place of residence is r at year t, and xr,t is the value of the 
economic variable for region r at year t. 
                                                                                                                                                 
other cases the suicide attacker was known to be from another region, and for the other 11 cases the 
origin of the attacker remained unknown.  
53 Additional information was compared to validate the match.  33
VII. Sample Descriptive Statistics and Estimation Results: 
 
Correlates of participation in Palestinian terrorist (Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) 
activities: 
 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.1 reports the means of selected demographic variables for Palestinian (Hamas 
and PIJ) terrorists and the Palestinian population of similar age, sex and religion, as were 
tabulated using the data set culled from the terrorists’ biographies as well as the “Labor 
Force Surveys in Judea, Samaria and Gaza”. The right-hand column displays the results 
of a Chi-square test run on each of the relevant characteristics and refers to a test of the 
null hypothesis that the characteristic is independent of terrorist status.  
An interesting finding of this data is that 31 percent of the Palestinians, compared to 
only 16 percent of the terrorists, were characterized as poor
54. Second, out of 208 
observations where information about the terrorist’s education was available, 
approximately 96 percent (200) have at least a high school education and approximately 
65 percent (135) have some kind of higher education, compared to 51 percent and 15 
percent, respectively, in the Palestinian population of same age, sex and religion.  
Third, age of the terrorists was either directly indicated in the biographies as the age 
of death (for those who died), the age at expelling time (for those that were expelled to 
Lebanon), or it was computed from the date of publication and the date of birth, when 
available. Age at or just prior to the time of publication was known or possible to 
compute for 296 of the terrorist biographies. The Palestinian population contains a larger 
share of its individuals at prime time earning ages (58 percent between 25 and 54 years of 
age) when compared to the terrorists (only 51 percent in the same age range). Compared 
to the general population, terrorists tend to be younger: where only 72 percent of the 
general population is below the age of 34, 91 percent of terrorists fall into this group.
55 
Fourth, terrorists tended to be from urban areas (54 percent of the 311 observations 
where this information was available), whereas only 34 percent of the Palestinian 
                                                 
54 See section V for the way that individual’s economic status was inferred in each of the populations and 
the potential problems introduced by it. 
55 Given the age distribution differences, the finding described previously (of differences in poverty and 
education) become even more striking.  34
population was living in urban areas. In particular, 47 percent of the terrorists lived in 
Gaza, compared to only 22 percent of the comparable population.  
Fifth, only 45 percent of the terrorists were married, compared to an average of 59 
percent in the population of individuals with similar age, sex and religion
56. Finally, out 
of 142 observations where information about labor force status of the terrorists was 
known, 94 percent held some kind of employment, whereas only 69 percent of the 
Palestinian population was employed. 
Table 1.2 reports the means when the sample is restricted to include only individuals 
between 18 and 41 years of age (slightly more than 94 percent of the Hamas and PIJ 
sample fall under this age range), and Table 1.3 is restricted further not to include the 50 
PIJ leaders deported on December 17, 1992. The means presented in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 
do not differ significantly from the ones obtained using the more inclusive sample 
reported on Table 1.1. Table 2.1 shows similar, though weaker differences, in the 
findings when characteristics of only suicide bombers are compared to the characteristics 
of the Palestinian population of same age, sex and religion. Table 2.2 displays the results 
when the sample is restricted to include only individuals between 17 and 28 years of age 
(slightly more than 90 percent of the suicide bombers sample fall under this age range). 
None of the 50 PIJ leaders deported on December 17, 1992 became suicide bombers, so 
that their exclusion was irrelevant. Tables 3.1 - 4.3 compare the characteristics of Hamas 
terrorists and the PIJ terrorists separately with the characteristics of the Palestinian 





Table 5.1 provides logistic estimates using the pooled sample of terrorists (Hamas 
and PIJ) and the “Labor Force Surveys in Judea, Samaria and Gaza” of 1993. The 
dependent variable equals one if the individual is a Hamas or PIJ terrorist, and zero 
                                                 
56 One should remember, however, the different age distribution mentioned earlier.   
57 One exception is poverty in Table 4.3 (in which the PIJ sample is restricted to include only individuals 
between 17 and 28 years of age, and restricted further not to include the 50 PIJ leaders deported on 
December 17, 1992) where the means are such that a chi-sq test could not reject the null hypothesis that 
the poverty characteristic is independent of PIJ terrorist status.   35
otherwise
58. The first three columns present the unweighted estimates and the last three 
columns present the weighted, consistent estimates. All estimates are statistically 
significant, and suggest that poverty is inversely related, and education is positively 
related, with the likelihood that someone becomes a Hamas or PIJ terrorist. The results 
remain similar and identical with respect to sign and significance of the coefficients when 
the sample is restricted not to include the 50 PIJ leaders deported on December 17, 1992 
(Table 5.2), and to include only individuals between 18 and 41 years of age (Table 5.3). 
Table 6.1 presents the logistic estimates of the same analysis with regard to Hamas and 
PIJ suicide bombers. The results are similar in terms of the directions of the effects and 
are all statistically significant, as well. Restricting the sample to include only individuals 
17-28 years old did not alter the results (Table 6.2). 
Introducing regional and marital status dummy variables into the equations improved 
the log likelihood fitness of the estimations, plus both dummies were statistically 
significant. An additional potentially valid control variable, the type of residence (refugee 
camp versus urban or rural localities), was insignificant once the regional dummy was 
included. Moreover, the inclusion of the type of residence dummy did not change any of 
the other results in terms of the signs or and significance of the coefficients.  
 
The effect of economic condition on the number of terrorist attacks: 
 
Estimation Results of Time Series Analysis 
Table 7 provides the coefficients of the negative binomial regression of the number of 
terrorist attacks (as the dependent variable) and the annual logarithm of the average wage 
(as the independent variable of interest). At first, the annual average wage was positively 
correlated with the number of terrorist attacks, but the coefficient was insignificant. 
Introducing a dummy variable to control for the possible differences of measures in the 
levels of the average wage when collected from different sources caused the effect to 
remain positive and become statistically significant at the 15 percent significance level. 
These results are very sensitive to specification, as is apparent from columns 3, 4 and 5. 
                                                 
58 Refer to section VI for more details about the estimation strategy and the problem of choice-based 
sampling.  36
Adding control variables brings back the positive correlation, but the coefficients remain 
insignificant. 
The estimates from a repetition of the above exercise using growth in GDP per capita 
as the independent variable, instead of the annual logarithm of average wage can be 
found in Table 8. The results show that the number of terrorist attacks moved pro-
cyclically (i.e. higher GDP growth was associated with a higher level of attacks) and the 
positive association becomes significant when controlling for the possible differences of 
measures in the levels due to the different sources, for the changes in population, and for 
a possible time trend. 
Table 9 contains the estimates of the analysis of suicide attacks when the economic 
variable of interest is the lagged growth in GDP per capita. The analysis of suicide 
attacks required additional sophistication due to the short period at hand.
59 Since GDP 
data were available for the West Bank and Gaza separately, two regions that jointly 
account for 94 percent of the suicide attacks for which I could identify the perpetrator’s 
residence of origin, the suicide attacks data was split according to the perpetrator’s 
residence between the two regions and analyzed with respect to the economic variables of 
the corresponding region. Hence, I was able to double the number of observations using 
the variability in the economic performance of the regions. For 6 of the 41 relevant 
suicide attacks, the region from which the perpetrator originated could not be identified; 
and in the case of 2 other attacks the perpetrator originated from outside the West Bank 
and Gaza. The first analysis using current GDP per capita growth yielded insignificant 
results under all the specifications. However, considering the one year lagged effect, as 
presented in Table 9, yields significant results when controlling for the possible 
differences of measures in the levels due to the different sources and for a possible time 
trend. Allowing a different level and slope between the two regions causes the 
significance level to improve. In all cases the number of suicide attacks moved pro-
cyclically.  
                                                 
59 The first fatal suicide attack accounted for in my time series data occurred on July 6, 1989. On a yearly 
basis until 2002 (inclusive), this would yield a maximum of 14 observations. However, reliable GDP 
data for 1993, the year in which the ICBS ceased surveying the Gaza strip and Jericho while the 
Palestinian authorities were not yet prepared to start their own orderly surveys and statistics, is missing. 
Moreover, data for 2002 was not yet available at time of writing this section.  37
Since it is conceivable that an increase in GDP or lagged GDP per capita would have 
a different impact, when compared to a decrease of those variables, on the tendency to 
carry out terrorist attacks, a dummy variable was introduced to the previously described 
models.  The dummy equaled one for an increase in GDP or lagged GDP per capita, and 
zero otherwise.  When introduced by itself and when included in a product with the main 




If there is a link between income level, education, and participation in terrorist 
activities, it is either very weak or in the opposite direction of what one intuitively might 
have expected. According to the findings of this paper, there is no reason to believe that 
increasing the years of schooling or raising the income level of individuals, without 
simultaneously modifying the educational content and monitoring (or at least limiting) 
the possible use of any additional income, will decrease the trend towards terror, the level 
of terror, or using means of terror. 
The importance of the use of education to fight terror is not invalidated, in spite of 
these disappointing findings, which suggest that increasing years of school enrollment 
and attainment of higher degrees by itself does not reduce the probability of participation 
in terrorist activities, and possibly increases participation. On the societal level, the 
findings are weaker and subject to different interpretations. However, in my opinion, the 
relationships are the same in direction, although much more complex. 
Policy makers, when trying to reduce terrorism via education or income, should focus 
not on the amount of education but on the content of education; changing the substance 
when needed in order to create positive stimulations towards democracy, moderation, 
appeasement and coexistence. Not all education is equal, and as Martin Luther King once 
said in another context, “education which stops with efficiency may prove the greatest 
menace to society. The most dangerous criminal may be the man gifted with reason but 
with no morals.”
60  It is sometimes obvious how educational tools are used to breed 
terrorism. Examples of this can be seen by excerpts from the school books of the Official 
Palestinian Authority education system. To demonstrate this point I have chosen a few 
quotes out of the official Palestinian Authority textbooks
61 (inciting parts/words are 
underlined): 
                                                 
60 From Martin Luther King, Jr.’s speech to Morehouse College in 1948 on “The Purpose of Education.” 
 http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/publications/papers/vol1/470200-The_Purpose_of_Education.htm 
61 Material provided by “The center for monitoring the impact of peace”: 
http://www.matckh.org/articles/pa-report.htm 
This organization is clearly not unbiased, but because I am using only the provided quotes from the 
original textbooks and do not rely on their interpretations, I have no reason to suspect inaccuracies.   39
•  “Know, my son, that Palestine is your country... that its pure soil is drenched with 
the blood of Martyrs …Answer this: Why must we fight the Jews and drive them 
out of our land?” [Our Arabic Language for Fifth Grade #542, p. 64-66] 
•  “Bayonets and Torches ... In your left hand you carried the Koran, And in your 
right an Arab sword ... Without blood not even one centimeter will be liberated  
Therefore, go forward crying: Allah is great.” [Reader and Literary Texts for 
Eighth Grade #578, p. 102] 
•  “Indeed, Satan has, in the eyes of many people, made their evil actions appear 
beautiful... Such a people are the Jews …” [Islamic Education for Eighth Grade 
#576, p. 95] 
•  “The clearest examples of racist belief and racial discrimination in the world are 
Nazism and Zionism.” [Modern Arab History for Twelfth Grade, Part I #648, p. 
123] 
•  “My brothers! The oppressors [Israel] have overstepped the boundary. Therefore 
Jihad and sacrifice are a duty ... are we to let them steal its Arab nature ... Draw 
your sword ... let us gather for war with red blood and blazing fire ... Death shall 
call and the sword shall be crazed from much slaughter … Oh Palestine, the youth 
will redeem your land...” [Reader and Literary Texts for Eighth Grade #578, p. 
120-122] 
•  “This religion will defeat all other religions and it will be disseminated, by Allah's 
will, through the Muslim Jihad fighters.” [Islamic Education for Seventh Grade 
#564, p. 125]  
•  “Martyred Jihad fighters are the most … honored people, after the Prophets...” 
[Reader And Literary Texts for Tenth Grade #607, p. 103]  
•  “Determine what is the subject, and what is the predicate, in the following 
sentences: The Jihad is a religious duty of every Muslim man and woman.” [Our 
Arabic Language for Fifth Grade #542, p. 167] 
A quick overview of the content shown above is enough to let us suspect that in this 
case educational tools are used to breed terrorism among the Palestinian Youth. In 
addition, a major part of one’s education is shaped or at least influenced at home. While  40
school can only do so much to put contents into an already molded structure, this 
structure sometimes tends to be in support of terrorist activities and will find it easy to 
legitimate them.  
The London-based Arabic-language daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat published an interview 
with Umm Nidal, the mother of the “Shahid” [martyr] Muhammad Farhat
62. When asked 
the question: "Did you have a role in the planting of this spirit [of becoming a suicide 
bomber] in Muhammad?" Umm Nidal answers: "Allah be praised, I am a Muslim and I 
believe in Jihad. Jihad is one of the elements of the faith and this is what encouraged me 
to sacrifice Muhammad in Jihad for the sake of Allah. My son was not destroyed, he is 
not dead; he is living a happier life than I. ... Because I love my son, I encouraged him to 
die a martyr's death for the sake of Allah... Jihad is a religious obligation incumbent upon 
us, and we must carry it out."  
Another blatant example was when Yassar Arafat's (president of the Palestinian 
Authority) wife, Suha, said in an interview on April 12, 2002 with London's Arabic-
language newspaper Al Majall that if she had a son, there would be "no greater honor" 
than for him to be a suicide bomber. Any educational system supportive of concepts like 
the one mentioned above would, in my opinion, only increase the probability of engaging 
in terrorist activities. 
Similarly, economic prosperity will not eliminate terrorism by itself. If individuals 
have no restrictions on what they may or may not do with their increased income, they 
may use it to buy more and improved weapons and increase their terrorist activities. 
Perhaps surprisingly, even extreme expression of terrorist acts such as suicide attacks 
seems to follow improvements and not deteriorations in economic conditions. Policy 
makers, once again, should promote the creation of a strictly enforced judicial system in 
order to ensure that wealth is channeled to the right places.   
                                                 
62 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), June 5, 2002 
English translation can be found at 
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP39102  41
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Deaths from terrorist 
attacks since 1949 
Number of fatal 
terrorist attacks since 
1949 
Deaths from suicide 
attacks since 1949 
Number of fatal suicide 
attacks since 1949 
Daily Average  0.094 0.045 0.026 0.004 
Daily STD  0.832 0.226 0.615 0.068 
Daily Max  33 3 29 3 
Daily Min  0 0 0 0 
Weekly** Average  0.658 0.313 0.182 0.027 
Weekly** STD  2.461 0.710 1.746 0.200 
Weekly** Max  41 8 32 3 
Weekly** Min  0 0 0 0 
Monthly Average  2.861 1.361 0.794 0.116 
Monthly STD  7.222 2.084 4.958 0.569 
Monthly Max  112 23  79  8 
Monthly Min  0 0 0 0 
Yearly* Average  33.907 16.259  9.111  1.352 
Yearly* STD  53.120 17.165 33.290  4.845 
Yearly* Median  24 11  0  0 
Yearly* Mode  3 3 0 0 
Yearly* Max  351 89 218 32 
Yearly* Min  0 0 0 0 
TOTAL  1857  883  515  75 




Educational Distribution of Palestinian Population Age 
18 or older in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as obtained 
from the Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey 
Research, between 19-24 December 2001. 
  Educational Distribution of Palestinian Population Age 
15-56 Males and Muslims as obtained from the 1993 
“Labor Force Surveys in Judea, Samaria and Gaza” 
 
Other/DK  12  1% Other  42  0%
Illiterate  162  12%  
Elementary  251  18% Primary  8,509  21%
Preparatory  347  26% Intermediate 11,332  28%
Secondary  368  27% Secondary  14,135  35%
College  111  8% Vocational 427  1%
BA  101  7% Post Secondary 2,596  6%
MA+  5  0% Academic institute 3,237  8%






























Information based on Ha’aretz internet special edition from June 8, 2001,
1 and additional 
information collected since. 
                                                 
1 The author’s free translation of the title is: “The opposing army” by Avrahami Avner. 
דגנמש אבצה רנבא ימהרבא תאמ  
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Police and Civil DefenseAppendix D
Palestinian Forces - General Structure
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Characteristics of Palestinian (Hamas and PIJ) terrorists and Palestinian population of 
similar age, sex and religion. 
  
Characteristics  Hamas      














Poverty   230    19590   
Poor 16%    31%     
Average 41%    48%     
Well 33%    20%     
Very Well  10%    0%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Age   296    41762   
15 - 17  3%    12%     
18 - 24  45%    28%     
25 - 34  43%    32%     
35 - 44  7%    17%     
45 - 54  1%    9%     
55 - 56  0%    1%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Education   208    40278   
Primary school  4%    21%     
Intermediate   0%    28%     
Secondary   31%    35%     
Vocational 8%    1%     
Post-secondary 1%    6%     
Academic 
institute  56%    8%   
 
Other 0%    0%     
     
 
 








Urban 54%    34%     
Rural 23%    54%     









Characteristics  Hamas      























previously  71%    81%   
 
Presently 
studies  29%    16%   
 
Never studied  0%    3%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Marital Status   238    41762   
Married 45%    59%     
Divorced 0%    0%     
Widowed 0%    0%     
Single 55%    41%     
         




  142    41759 
 
Full-time 
employment  90%    60%   
 
Part-time 
employment  4%    6%   
 
Absent from 
work  0%    3%   
 
Unemployed 0%    6%     
Not part of 
labor force  7%    25%   
 
         




  306    41762 
 
Gaza 47%    22%     
Judea Samaria  49%    78%     
Northern 1%    0%     
Central 0%    0%     
Southern 0%    0%     
Jerusalem  3%    0%   
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Chi-square test refers to a test of the null hypothesis that the characteristic is  independent of Hamas 





Characteristics of Palestinian (Hamas and PIJ) terrorists and Palestinian population of 
similar age, sex and religion – sample restricted: only individuals between 18-41 years of 
age were included. 
  
Characteristics  Hamas      














Poverty   208    16195   
Poor 16%    32%     
Average 41%    48%     
Well 33%    20%     
Very Well  10%    0%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Age   279    30585   
18 - 24  48%    39%     
25 - 31  38%    33%     
32 - 38  13%    21%     
39 - 41  1%    7%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Education   186    29992   
Primary school  4%    19%     
Intermediate   0%    27%     
Secondary   30%    36%     
Vocational 8%    1%     
Post-secondary 2%    8%     
Academic 
institute  57%    9%   
 
Other 0%    0%     
     
 
 








Urban 55%    33%     
Rural 22%    54%     









Characteristics  Hamas      























previously  72%    88%   
 
Presently 
studies  28%    10%   
 
Never studied  0%    2%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Marital Status   214    30585   
Married 44%    60%     
Divorced 0%    0%     
Widowed 0%    0%     
Single 56%    40%     
         




  130    30583 
 
Full-time 
employment  90%    64%   
 
Part-time 
employment  4%    6%   
 
Absent from 
work  0%    3%   
 
Unemployed 0%    7%     
Not part of 
labor force  6%    19%   
 
         




  273    30585 
 
Gaza 48%    22%     
Judea Samaria  49%    78%     
Northern 0%    0%     
Central 0%    0%     
Southern 0%    0%     
Jerusalem  2%    0%   
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Chi-square test refers to a test of the null hypothesis that the characteristic is  independent of Hamas 





Characteristics of Palestinian (Hamas and PIJ) terrorists and Palestinian population of 
similar age, sex and religion – sample restricted: only individuals between 18-41 years of 
age were included, and 50 PIJ leaders deported on December 17, 1992 were not included. 
  
Characteristics  Hamas      














Poverty   163    16195   
Poor 20%    32%     
Average 40%    48%     
Well 30%    20%     
Very Well  10%    0%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Age   230    30585   
18 - 24  55%    39%     
25 - 31  36%    33%     
32 - 38  8%    21%     
39 - 41  1%    7%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Education   144    29992   
Primary school  4%    19%     
Intermediate   0%    27%     
Secondary   38%    36%     
Vocational 3%    1%     
Post-secondary 2%    8%     
Academic 
institute  53%    9%   
 
Other 0%    0%     
     
 
 








Urban 52%    33%     
Rural 20%    54%     









Characteristics  Hamas      























previously  69%    88%   
 
Presently 
studies  31%    10%   
 
Never studied  0%    2%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Marital Status   214    30585   
Married 33%    60%     
Divorced 0%    0%     
Widowed 0%    0%     
Single 67%    40%     
         




  92    30583 
 
Full-time 
employment  88%    64%   
 
Part-time 
employment  5%    6%   
 
Absent from 
work  0%    3%   
 
Unemployed 0%    7%     
Not part of 
labor force  7%    19%   
 
         




  224    30585 
 
Gaza 53%    22%     
Judea Samaria  43%    78%     
Northern 0%    0%     
Central 0%    0%     
Southern 0%    0%     
Jerusalem  3%    0%   
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Chi-square test refers to a test of the null hypothesis that the characteristic is  independent of Hamas 





Characteristics of Hamas and PIJ Palestinian Suicide bombers and Palestinian population 















Poverty   48    18803   
Poor 13%    32%     
Average 54%    48%     
Well 25%    20%     
Very Well  8%    0%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Age   63    38875   
15 - 17  8%    13%     
18 - 24  67%    30%     
25 - 34  22%    33%     
35 - 44  0%    18%     
45 - 50  3%    6%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Education   44    37824   
Primary school  2%    20%     
Intermediate   0%    28%     
Secondary   36%    36%     
Vocational 5%    1%     
Post-secondary 2%    7%     
Academic 
institute  55%    8%   
 
     
 
 








Urban 53%    34%     
Rural 17%    54%     































previously  50%    83%   
 
Presently 
studies  50%    15%   
 
Never studied  0%    3%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Marital Status   50    38875   
Married 16%    58%     
Divorced 0%    0%     
Widowed 0%    0%     
Single 84%    42%     
         




  24    38872 
 
Full-time 
employment  96%    61%   
 
Part-time 
employment  0%    6%   
 
Absent from 
work  0%    3%   
 
Unemployed 0%    6%     
Not part of 
labor force  4%    24%   
 
         




  62    38875 
 
Gaza 45%    22%     
Judea Samaria  47%    78%     
Northern 2%    0%     
Central 0%    0%     
Southern 0%    0%     
Jerusalem  7%    0%   
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
 
Chi-square test refers to a test of the null hypothesis that the characteristic is  independent of Suicide 




Characteristics of Hamas and PIJ Palestinian Suicide bombers and Palestinian population 
of similar age, sex and religion - sample restricted: only individuals between 17-28 years 















Poverty   45    8947   
Poor 13%    40%     
Average 56%    45%     
Well 24%    15%     
Very Well  7%    0%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Age   57    19905   
17 - 20  33%    40%     
21 - 24  47%    30%     
25 - 28  19%    30%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.018 
Education   42    19593   
Primary school  2%    15%     
Intermediate   0%    26%     
Secondary   38%    44%     
Vocational 5%    1%     
Post-secondary 2%    5%     
Academic 
institute  52%    7%   
 
     
 
 








Urban 53%    32%     
Rural 13%    55%     































previously  47%    77%   
 
Presently 
studies  53%    22%   
 
Never studied  0%    1%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Marital Status   46    19905   
Married 11%    33%     
Divorced 0%    0%     
Widowed 0%    0%     
Single 89%    67%     
         




  21    19903 
 
Full-time 
employment  95%    52%   
 
Part-time 
employment  0%    6%   
 
Absent from 
work  0%    3%   
 
Unemployed 0%    8%     
Not part of 
labor force  5%    31%   
 
         




  53    19905 
 
Gaza 51%    21%     
Judea Samaria  47%    79%     
Northern 0%    0%     
Central 0%    0%     
Southern 0%    0%     
Jerusalem  2%    0%   
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
 
Chi-square test refers to a test of the null hypothesis that the characteristic is  independent of Suicide 




Characteristics of Hamas terrorists and Palestinian population of similar age, sex and 
religion. 
  













Poverty   134    18803   
Poor 16%    32%     
Average 40%    48%     
Well 31%    20%     
Very Well  13%    0%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Age   170    38875   
15 - 17  2%    13%     
18 - 24  49%    30%     
25 - 34  40%    33%     
35 - 44  8%    18%     
45 - 50  1%    6%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Education   117    37824   
Primary school  2%    20%     
Intermediate   0%    28%     
Secondary   35%    36%     
Vocational 3%    1%     
Post-secondary 3%    7%     
Academic 
institute  58%    8%   
 
Other 0%    0%     
     
 
 








Urban 54%    34%     
Rural 20%    54%     































previously  67%    83%   
 
Presently 
studies  33%    15%   
 
Never studied  0%    3%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Marital Status   129    38875   
Married 35%    58%     
Divorced 0%    0%     
Widowed 0%    0%     
Single 65%    42%     
         




  78    38872 
 
Full-time 
employment  87%    61%   
 
Part-time 
employment  5%    6%   
 
Absent from 
work  0%    3%   
 
Unemployed 0%    6%     
Not part of 
labor force  8%    24%   
 
         




  178    38875 
 
Gaza 49%    22%     
Judea Samaria  44%    78%     
Northern 2%    0%     
Central 0%    0%     
Southern 0%    0%     
Jerusalem  4%    0%   
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 






Characteristics of Hamas terrorists and Palestinian population of similar age, sex and 
religion – sample restricted: only individuals between 18-41 years of age were included. 
  













Poverty   120    16195   
Poor 17%    32%     
Average 39%    48%     
Well 31%    20%     
Very Well  13%    0%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Age   163    30585   
18 - 24  50%    39%     
25 - 31  40%    33%     
32 - 38  9%    21%     
39 - 41  1%    7%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Education   102    29954   
Primary school  2%    19%     
Intermediate   0%    27%     
Secondary   33%    36%     
Vocational 3%    1%     
Post-secondary 3%    8%     
Academic 
institute  59%    9%   
 
     
 
 








Urban 52%    33%     
Rural 20%    54%     































previously  66%    88%   
 
Presently 
studies  34%    10%   
 
Never studied  0%    2%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Marital Status   115    30585   
Married 33%    60%     
Divorced 0%    0%     
Widowed 0%    0%     
Single 67%    40%     
         




  70    30583 
 
Full-time 
employment  87%    64%   
 
Part-time 
employment  4%    6%   
 
Absent from 
work  0%    3%   
 
Unemployed 0%    7%     
Not part of 
labor force  9%    19%   
 
         




  160    30585 
 
Gaza 50%    22%     
Judea Samaria  45%    78%     
Northern 1%    0%     
Central 1%    0%     
Southern 1%    0%     
Jerusalem  3%    0%   
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 






Characteristics of Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists and Palestinian population of similar 















Poverty   97    19590   
Poor 14%    31%     
Average 44%    48%     
Well 36%    20%     
Very Well  5%    0%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Age   126    41762   
15 - 17  6%    12%     
18 - 24  40%    28%     
25 - 34  44%    32%     
35 - 44  8%    17%     
45 - 54  1%    9%     
55 - 56  1%    1%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Education   92    40278   
Primary school  7%    21%     
Intermediate   0%    28%     
Secondary   26%    35%     
Vocational 14%    1%     
Post-secondary 0%    6%     
Academic 
institute  53%    8%   
 
Other 0%    0%     
     
 
 








Urban 54%    34%     
Rural 26%    54%     































previously  77%    81%   
 
Presently 
studies  23%    16%   
 
Never studied  0%    3%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.031 
Marital Status   110    41762   
Married 55%    59%     
Divorced 0%    0%     
Widowed 0%    0%     
Single 45%    41%     
         




  64    41759 
 
Full-time 
employment  94%    60%   
 
Part-time 
employment  3%    6%   
 
Absent from 
work  0%    3%   
 
Unemployed 0%    6%     
Not part of 
labor force  3%    25%   
 
         




  129    41762 
 
Gaza 45%    22%     
Judea Samaria  54%    78%     
Northern 0%    0%     
Central 0%    0%     
Southern 0%    0%     
Jerusalem  1%    0%   
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
 





Characteristics of Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists and Palestinian population of similar 
















Poverty   88    16195   
Poor 16%    32%     
Average 43%    48%     
Well 35%    20%     
Very Well  6%    0%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Age   116    30585   
18 - 24  44%    39%     
25 - 31  35%    33%     
32 - 38  19%    21%     
39 - 41  2%    7%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.130 
Education   84    29954   
Primary school  6%    19%     
Intermediate   0%    27%     
Secondary   26%    36%     
Vocational 13%    1%     
Post-secondary 0%    8%     
Academic 
institute  55%    9%   
 
     
 
 








Urban 58%    33%     
Rural 26%    54%     































previously  80%    88%   
 
Presently 
studies  20%    10%   
 
Never studied  0%    2%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.003 
Marital Status   99    30585   
Married 58%    60%     
Divorced 0%    0%     
Widowed 0%    0%     
Single 42%    40%     
         




  60    30583 
 
Full-time 
employment  93%    64%   
 
Part-time 
employment  3%    6%   
 
Absent from 
work  0%    3%   
 
Unemployed 0%    7%     
Not part of 
labor force  3%    19%   
 
         




  113    30585 
 
Gaza 44%    22%     
Judea Samaria  55%    78%     
Jerusalem 1%    0%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
 





Characteristics of Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists and Palestinian population of similar 
age, sex and religion – sample restricted: only individuals between 18-41 years of age 














Poverty   43    16195   
Poor 28%    32%     
Average 44%    48%     
Well 28%    20%     
Very Well  0%    0%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.666 
Age   67    30585   
18 - 24  66%    39%     
25 - 31  27%    33%     
32 - 38  7%    21%     
39 - 41  0%    7%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
Education   42    29954   
Primary school  10%    19%     
Intermediate   0%    27%     
Secondary   48%    36%     
Vocational 5%    1%     
Post-secondary 0%    8%     
Academic 
institute  38%    9%   
 
     
 
 








Urban 53%    33%     
Rural 21%    54%     































previously  77%    88%   
 
Presently 
studies  23%    10%   
 
Never studied  0%    2%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.005 
Marital Status   50    30585   
Married 32%    60%     
Divorced 0%    0%     
Widowed 0%    0%     
Single 68%    40%     
         




  22    30583 
 
Full-time 
employment  91%    64%   
 
Part-time 
employment  9%    6%   
 
Absent from 
work  0%    3%   
 
Unemployed 0%    7%     
Not part of 
labor force  0%    19%   
 
         




  64    30585 
 
Gaza 61%    22%     
Judea Samaria  37%    78%     
Jerusalem 2%    0%     
         
p-value for chi-sq test = 
0.000 
 





Logistic Estimates of Participation in Hamas and PIJ 
Dependent Variable is 1 if Individual is a Hamas or PIJ terrorist, and 0 Otherwise 
Standard errors shown in Parentheses, marginal effects are presented in brackets. 
 
  Unweighted Estimates  Weighted Estimates 
















  (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 

























  (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 





***  --- 1.121
***  1.253
*** 
   (0.163)  (0.174)  (0.162)  (0.175) 
   [0.002]
†  [0.002]
†   [0.004]
†  [0.004]
† 
Married ---  ---  -0.926
*** ---  --- -0.909
*** 
(1=yes)        
     (0.222)    (0.209) 
     [0.001]
†    [0.002]
† 
        
Pseudo  R2  0.3612 0.3801 0.3776 0.3718 0.3906 0.   3881  
Number of 
obs. 
19810 19810 19789 19810 19810 19789 
Notes: Sample size is 42097. Sample pools together observations on Hamas and PIJ and 
the general population from 1993 Labor Force Survey in Judea, Samaria and Gaza 
(ICBS). Weights used in columns (4), (5) and (6) are relative share of Hamas and PIJ in 
population to their share in the sample and relative share of survey respondents in the 
population to their share in the sample. Weight is 0.12566 for Hamas and PIJ sample and 
0.080491 for the survey sample. 
(
†) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
(***) significant at 5% significance level. 
(**)significant at 10% significance level. 





Logistic Estimates of Participation in Hamas and PIJ – Sample restricted not to include 
the 50 PIJ leaders deported on December 17, 1992. 
Dependent Variable is 1 if Individual is a Hamas or PIJ terrorist, and 0 Otherwise 
Standard errors shown in Parentheses, marginal effects are presented in brackets. 
 
  Unweighted Estimates  Weighted Estimates 
















  (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 

























  (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 





***  --- 1.464
***  1.756
*** 
   (0.181)  (0.197)  (0.180)  (0.195) 
   [0.002]
†  [0.002]
†   [0.003]
†  [0.004]
† 
Married ---  ---  -1.581
*** ---  --- -1.566
*** 
(1=yes)        
     (0.272)    (0.258) 
     [-0.002]
†     [0.003]
† 
        
Pseudo  R2  0.3648 0.3970 0.4081 0.3749 0.4071 0.4184 
Number of 
obs. 
19764 19764 19743 19764 19764 19743 
Notes: Sample size is 42097. Sample pools together observations on Hamas and PIJ and 
the general population from 1993 Labor Force Survey in Judea, Samaria and Gaza 
(ICBS). Weights used in columns (4), (5) and (6) are relative share of Hamas and PIJ in 
population to their share in the sample and relative share of survey respondents in the 
population to their share in the sample. Weight is 0.12566 for Hamas and PIJ sample and 
0.080491 for the survey sample. 
(
†) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
(***) significant at 5% significance level. 
(**)significant at 10% significance level. 





Logistic Estimates of Participation in Hamas and PIJ – sample restricted: only individuals 
between 18-41 years of age were included, and the 50 PIJ leaders deported on December 
17, 1992 were not included.  
Dependent Variable is 1 if Individual is a Hamas or PIJ terrorist, and 0 Otherwise 
Standard errors shown in Parentheses, marginal effects are presented in brackets. 
 
  Unweighted Estimates  Weighted Estimates 
















  (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 

























  (0.022) (0.023) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) 





***  --- 1.403
***  1.679
*** 
   (0.187)  (0.204)  (0.183)  (0.197) 
   [0.001]
†  [0.003]
†   [0.005]
†  [0.005]
† 
Married ---  ---  -1.540
***  --- ---  -1.533
*** 
(1=yes)        
     (0.280)    (0.267) 
     [-0.002]
†     [-0.004]
† 
        
Pseudo  R2  0.3612 0.3913 0.4043 0.3705 0.4005 0.4141 
Number of 
obs. 
16358 16358 16339 16358 16358 16339 
Notes: Sample size is 42097. Sample pools together observations on Hamas and PIJ and 
the general population from 1993 Labor Force Survey in Judea, Samaria and Gaza 
(ICBS). Weights used in columns (4), (5) and (6) are relative share of Hamas and PIJ in 
population to their share in the sample and relative share of survey respondents in the 
population to their share in the sample. Weight is 0.12566 for Hamas and PIJ sample and 
0.080491 for the survey sample. 
(
†) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
(***) significant at 5% significance level. 
(**)significant at 10% significance level. 





Logistic Estimates of being a suicide bomber 
Dependent Variable is 1 if Individual is a suicide bomber, and 0 Otherwise 
Standard errors shown in Parentheses, marginal effects are presented in brackets. 
 
  Unweighted Estimates  Weighted Estimates 
















  (0.070)   (0.070)   (0.074)  (0.095)  (0.084)  (0.085) 

























  (0.052) (0.052) (0.061) (0.069) (0.063) (0.064) 





***  --- 1.959
***  2.445
*** 
   (0.365)  (0.382)  (0.377)  (0.394) 
   [0.000]
†  [0.000]
†   [2.83e-06]
†  [3.15e-06]
† 
Married ---  ---  -2.525
***  --- ---  -2.681
*** 
(1=yes)        
     (0.711)    (0.664) 
     [-0.000]
†     [-3.18e-06]
† 
        
Pseudo  R2  0.4740 0.5009 0.5240 0.4110 0.4444 0.4642 
Number of 
obs. 
19637 19637 19635 19637 19637 19635 
Notes: Sample size is 41828. Sample pools together observations on suicide bombers and 
the general population from 1993 Labor Force Survey in Judea, Samaria and Gaza 
(ICBS). Weights used in columns (4), (5) and (6) are relative share of suicide bombers in 
population to their share in the sample and relative share of survey respondents in the 
population to their share in the sample. Weight is 0.006338 for suicide bombers sample 
and 0.079977 for the survey sample. 
(
†) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
(***) significant at 5% significance level. 
(**)significant at 10% significance level. 





Logistic Estimates of being a suicide bomber – sample restricted: only individuals 
between 17-28 years of age were included. 
Dependent Variable is 1 if Individual is a suicide bomber, and 0 Otherwise 
Standard errors shown in Parentheses, marginal effects are presented in brackets. 
 
  Unweighted Estimates  Weighted Estimates 
















  (0.079)   (0.080)   (0.082)  (0.106)  (0.089)  (0.089) 

























  (0.068) (0.070) (0.080) (0.094) (0.074) (0.088) 





***  --- 2.238
***  2.606
*** 
   (0.380)  (0.400)  (0.402)  (0.413) 
   [0.001]
†  [0.001]
†   [0.000]
†  [0.000]
† 
Married ---  ---  -2.291
***  --- ---  -2.401
*** 
(1=yes)        
     (0.786)    (0.730) 
     [-0.001]
†     [-0.000]
† 
        
Pseudo  R2  0.4452 0.4787 0.4987 0.3788 0.4245 0.4398 
Number of 
obs. 
8992 8992 8990 8992 8992 8990 
Notes: Sample size is 41828. Sample pools together observations on suicide bombers and 
the general population from 1993 Labor Force Survey in Judea, Samaria and Gaza 
(ICBS). Weights used in columns (4), (5) and (6) are relative share of suicide bombers in 
population to their share in the sample and relative share of survey respondents in the 
population to their share in the sample. Weight is 0.006338 for suicide bombers sample 
and 0.079977 for the survey sample. 
(
†) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
(***) significant at 5% significance level. 
(**)significant at 10% significance level. 
(*)significant at 15% significance level. 
 Table 7 
 
Negative binomial regression for the number of terrorists attack  
Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The economic variable of interest, in this case the logarithm of the annual average wage, 
was obtain from three different sources
1.   




*  -0.891  -0.818  -0.033 0.897 0.006 0.096
 
  (1.165) (0.995) (1.235) (0.936) (1.024) (1.344) (1.013) (1.028) 
source dummy 1   0.880






    (0.321) (0.573) (0.595) (0.580) (0.401) (0.568) (0.574) 
source dummy 2        -0.314  0.602
*  0.420 
            (0.422) (0.369) (0.557) 
year dummy     0.075
***   -0.075
*     -0.033 
     (0.026)    (0.050)     (0.075) 
log(popsize)      2.828
***  4.738
***   3.419
***  4.072
*** 
      (0.661)  (1.434)    (0.729)  (1.669) 
constant  -1.330 -6.587  -141.845
*** -13.162
*** 116.862 -2.644  -22.410
*** 36.950 
 (6.706)  (5.752)  (47.792)  (4.881)  (86.417)  (7.880)  (7.294)  (136.308)
Number of obs.  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
(***), (**) and (*) refers to the significance level at 5%, 10% and 15% respectively. 
                                                 
1Source 1- The Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, as published on table 3.13 in “The Economics of the West Bank and Gaza Strip”, Fawzi 
A. Gharaibeh , Westview Press 1985. for the years 1971-1980. 
 Source 2- computation from the “Labor Force Surveys in Judea, Samaria and Gaza
” for the period 1981-1993. 
Source 3- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics for the period 1995-2001. Table 8 
 
Negative binomial regression for the number of terrorists attack. 
Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The economic variable of interest, in this case the annual GDP per capita growth rate, 
was obtain from two different sources
1.   
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP pc growth  0.158 0.315 0.402 0.460 0.169  1.048
*** 
  (0.515) (0.527) (0.569) (0.484) (0.532) (0.453) 
source dummy        0.770
***  -2.123
*** 
       (0.286)  (0.796) 






   (0.012)  (0.037)  (0.051) 













  (0.145) (23.434) (2.215) (66.234) (0.153) (88.152) 
Number of obs.  32 32 32 32 32 32 
(***), (**) and (*) refers to the significance level at 5%, 10% and 15% respectively. 
                                                 
1Source 1- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics for the period 1969-1992. 
 Source 2- The CIA world fact book for the period 1994-2001. 
I did not compute the 1993 GDP per capita growth because it would assume possible comparison of the GDP levels between the two sources.  Table 9 
 
Negative binomial regression for the number of suicide terrorists attack. 
Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The economic variable of interest, in this case the lagged logarithm of the annual GDP 
per capita growth, was obtain from two different sources
1.   
 
   (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged 
(GDP pc growth) 





  (0.897) (0.879) (1.119) (1.143) (1.361) (1.493) 
Lag 
[(GDP pc gr) *wb] 
      -2.070
* -2.716
** 
       (1.322)  (1.444) 
source dummy     -2.507  -2.507  -3.090
** -3.421
** 
     (1.749)  (1.749)  (1.773)  (1.766) 






    (0.102) (0.231) (0.232) (0.232) (0.229) 
wb dummy     -0.003   0.658 
      (0.735)    (0.699) 






  (0.409)  (202.927) (460.920) (462.762) (461.780) (456.466) 
Number of obs.  22 22 22 22 22 22 
(***), (**) and (*) refers to the significance level at 5%, 10% and 15% respectively. 
                                                 
1Source 1- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics for the period 1989-1992. 
 Source 2- The CIA world fact book for the period 1994-2001. 